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Mysterious Word，“Nature" 
Our life under the law directly or indirectly is based on and conditioned 
by nature like the saying “we can't go beyond the limits imposed upon us 
by nature". The word “nature"， however， has at least double meanings. 
Certainly， ithas been used to connote matters of a wider range from 
uniformity， unchangeabi1ty， inflexibility to universal or objective va1idity， 
eternal beauty --which lie and extend behind and above our daily life. 
Poets， scientists and others referred to it from this aspect. 
But， ithas also another aspect which may wel1 be symbolized by 
coolness， brutality， violence， and so on. It may be enough for its under-
standing to cite the following passage: 
“In sober truth， nearly al the things which men are hanged or 
imprisoned for doing to one another， are nature's every day perform-
ances.田- - - - Nature impales men， breaks them as if on the wheel， 
casts them to be devoured by wild beasts， burns them to death， 
crushes them with stones 1ike the first christian martyr， starves them 
with hunger， freezes them with cold， poisons them by the quick or 
* Professor of General Jurisprudence， Faculty of Law， Osaka University， L. L. D. Tokyo Univer令
sity， 1968. 
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slow venom of her exhalations， and has hundreds of other hideous 
deaths in reserve， such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a 
Domitian never surpassed".l) 
Our life under the law， whether we dislike to recognize it or not， is
unavoidably placed under nexus of nature in these double aspects. Such a 
fact， being recognized， must inf1uence our knowledge inc1uding of law. 
My theme fundamentally concerns with this fact. 
Law as a part of culture 
Law is said to be a part of culture which means here creative products of 
human being concerning several ideas and institutions. Culture， though 
based on， has' often been contrasted with nature， aswell as custom with 
nature in the earlier period. But， culture increasingly in the course of history 
of ideas has been given a position originally given custom， and often culture 
in contrast with nature has been understood in terms of “ought" versus “isH， 
or “value" versus “fact". .The contrast of this sort may come from the idea 
that brutal nature must be placed under control through highly developed 
human knowledge， that is， culture， or cultural effort 10 reshape it according 
to the purpose of human utility. 
Thus， law has been given a role as a means of social control in the 
modern society. It 1S for this reason that modern writers in the Westem 
world have pointed out the very meaning of the positive law as a part of 
culture in contrast with nature in terms of methodological distinction of 
value - fact， ought - is， that is， methodological dualism. 1 think the 
dualistic approach in the theoretical study and discussion principally useful， 
in order to avoid possible confusion of ideal， or own personal wishes with 
reality or something like. 
Law's place in the is-ought relation and the dualistic approach 
But， 1 know in fact how ambiguously the word law or positive law has 
been used in regard to is and ought， and there is， 1 feel， a slight question to 
examine about its usage. On the one hand， positive law made by human 
1) J. S. Mill， Nature， in:Essays on ethics， religion and society， Collected works of J ohn Stuart 
Mil1， vol. X， ed. by F. E. L. Priestley and J. M. Robson， p.385， 1969. Cf. also J. Frank， Courts on 
trial， p.354， 1949. 
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political power indicates ought by contrast with is of laws of nature， e.g.， 
laws oI gravitation. On the other hand， positive law is often identified 
with law as it is as markedly distinguished from lawαs it ought to be， like 
morals， naturallaw， higher law， etc. 
First， itshows us complexity of the word positive law in the context 
it is used. According to F. S. C. Northrop， itmay wel1 to cal1 positive law 
normative “iS"2) in this meaning. 
Secondフ italso shows us incidentally a double usage of the word law， 
that is， laws of nature and naturallaw. 
Third， idea of laws of nature and natural law show us commonly 
something 1ike human aspiration to find objectively or universally valid 
standards independent of as well as immanent in our reality， inspite of 
each own different character of the former is and of the latter ought. That 
is why positive law is figurativelly called normative“is" in terms of such a 
middle position between both. 
It is often said as if self司evidentthat these standards are located and 
function above and under the positive law. We have a great deal in common 
with recognition of certain types of laws of nature， while not of natural 
law. Especially in modern civilized society， itcameto be felt more difficult 
to recognize natural law besides the positive law， man-made law， partly due 
to the demystified mood of this period. 
Nevertheless， we can even now hear some whispering that one must 
look behind paper law to reach to， or togain firmly established standards 
underlying it， for example， human nature， nature of things， rerum natura， 
etc. As it well known， their role and significance in theorY' and practice 
have been stressed from ancient to modern， or present. Is it' anachronistic 
at present to stress them， or to endeavor to get them? It depends on how 
to search for them. In a 1imited sense， 1 think， there is a good reason to do 
it even in our highly civilized or demystified world， and here is a task of my 
simple paper. 1 would like to trace some causes of why repeatedly such 
attempts have been made by so many different scholars of different periods 
in a similar way of thinking. 
2) Cited in a litle bit modified way. Cf. J. Coh巴n，R. A. H. Robson， A.Bates， Parental authority: 
The community and the law， pp.15 f.， 1958. 
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2 Ulpian's Natural Law in Justinian's Code 
Justinian's Code will offer an interesting example for this purpose. It 
inc1udes Ulpian's statement of naturallaw. This statement was inserted by 
the compilers as a legal provision in the Code， Digesta (or Pandectae)， and 
also in another Code， Institutiones. It says that “Ius naturale est， quod 
natura omnia anima1ia docuit: nam ius istud non humani generis proprium， 
sed omnium animalium， quae in terra， quae in mari nascuntur， avium quoque 
commune est. hinc descendit maris atque feminae coniunctio quam nos 
matrimonium appel1amus， hinc liberorum procreatio， hinc educatio: videmus 
etenim cetera quoque anima1ia， feras etiam istius peritia censeri". 3) 
The provision curiously stimulates us in its strange or unique feature in 
treating both human being and animal as if the same or equal before 
“nature"ト especiallyunder natural “instinct" planted by natureり 1shall 
cal it tentatively instinctive natural law. Then， itraises several issues worth 
to notice. 
First， the provision or Ulpian's statement in regard to its originality 
was doubted by scholars in the later period and often held as compilers' 
interpolatio. 
Second， apart from this suspicion， the provision is said to be isolate. 
Natural law in Digesta， or Institutiones， being principally identified with ius 
gentium or“rule of the Law common to al Nations"S) as exemplified by 
Gaius， in contrast with civi1 law， ius civile， isbased on dichotomy against 
Ulpian's trichotomy (naturallaw， ius gentium， civillaw). 
Third， despite of this difference， word “natural" in both usages 
commonly indicates certain matters or the state of affairs independent of 
and immanent in human creative activity which 1 tentatively cal latent 
natural law， while it does not indicate something like universally valid value 
standards independent of or， transcendent from human creative activity 
which is merely seen in the other statement or provision of Ulpian referring 
3) Digesta， 1.1. 1.3. 
4) Cf. Austin's opinion， below. 
5) H. S. Maine， Ancient law， 1861， 362 The World's Classics， Oxford， p.41， 1931. 
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to equal1iberty of human beings before nature6) and the provision of natural 
law originating from divine wi17) (said to come from the Christian ruler， 
Justinian， and compilers)， and which 1 te抵抗ivellycal normative natural 
law. 
Fourth， in the panoramatic scope of Justinian's Code， three types of 
natural law 1 named for the convenience may serve as models for showing 
each own relation to divergent levels of fact and value， isand ought. Only 
1 can suggest here transition from instinctive through latent to normative 
natural law almost parallel to change fromis to ought， from fact to value. 
日立h，in this connection nature of things， rerum natura may well be said 
c10sed to the latent. One provision in the Code， Institutiones says as 
follows: ‘ヘー ・ー由 iurenatura1i， quod， sicut diximus， appel1atur ius gentium 
剖蛸 m ・ palam est autem vetustius esse naturale ius， quod cum ipso genere 
humano rerum natura prodidit ----'地)
3 Critical Comment 
It is no wonder for scholars to attack the idea of instinctive natural 
law in regard to its alleged improper confusion of human being with animal 
since they be1ieve in human being's distinct qua1ity of reason or rational 
knowledge. For instance， H. Grotius made a criticism from this point of 
view: “Discrimen autem quod in Iuris Romani libris exstat， ut jus 
immutabile a1iud sit quod animantibus cum homine sit commune， quod 
arctiori significatu vocant jus naturae， aliud hominum proprium， quod saepe 
jus gentium nuncupant， usum vix ullum habet. Nam juris proprie capax non 
est nisi natura praeceptis utens generalibus -帽皿 _"9)
J. J. Rousseau made a similar criticism from more refined point of view 
of “nature": “Without speaking of the ancient philosophers who seem to 
have tried their best to contradict each other on the most fundamental 
principles， the Roman jurists subject man and al the other animals 
6) Dig.， I.1. 4. 
7) Inst.， I. 2. 11. 
8) Inst.， I.1. 11. Cf. R. Weigland， Die Naturrechtslehre der Legisten und Dekretisten von 
lrnerius bis Accursius und von Gratian bis Johannes Teutonicus， S.16， 1967. 
9) H. Grotius， De iure belli ac pacis， lib.1. 11. p.6， CI:> IX XXI. 
， 
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indifferently to the same naturallaw (loi naturelle)， because they consider 
under this name the law that nature imposes upon itself rather than that 
which it prescribes; or rather because of the particular sense in which those 
jurists understand the word law， which on this occasion they seem to have 
taken only for the expression of the general relations established by nature 
among al1 animate beings for thier common preservation. The moderns， 
recognizing under the name law only a rule prescribed to a moral being， 
that is to say， intelligent， free， and condidered in his relations with other 
beings， consequently limit the competence of natural law to the sole animal 
endowed with reason， namely man; but each defining this law in his own 
fashion， they al1 establish it upon such metaphysical principles that even 
among us there are very few people capable of comprehending these 
principles， far from being able to find them by themselves'ソ0) Both， Grotius 
and Rousseau are the modern writers. How about the situations in the 
premodern periods? 
4 Rearrangement 
We must recognize new situation increasingly appeared according to the 
development of the Christian tradition which in a considerable degree was 
connected with an orientation to universal1y or objectively valid value 
standards， that is to say， normative natural law above mentioned. It must 
be， however， more interesting to see those different types of naturallaw， 
seemingly conflicting with each other， sometimes peacefully rearranged in 
order. Preceding the Christian period， M. T. Cicero， too， did it，l1) and the 
10) J. J. Rousseau， Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inるgalite，Pref.， transl. by and 
quoted at R. D. Masters， The political philosophy of Rousseau， pp.77 f.， 1968. 
11)“First of al， Nature has endowed every species of living creature with the instinct of self-
preservation， of avoiding what seems likely to cause injury to lif，巴orlimb， andof procuring and provid-
ing everything needful for life - food， shelter， and the like. A common property of al creatures is 
also the reproductive instinct (the purpose of which is the propagation of the species) and also a 
certain amount of concern for their offspring. But the most marked difference between man and 
beast is this: the beast， just as far as it is moved by the senses and with very litle perception of past 
or future， adapts itself to that alone whi'ch is present at the moment; while man - because he is 
endowed with reason， by which he comprehends the chain of consequences， perceives the causes of 
things， understands the relation of cause to eff，巴ctand of effect to cause， draws analogies， and connects 
and associates the present and the future - easily surveys the course of his whole 1ife and makes 
the necessary preparations for its conduct". M. T. Cicero， De officiis， L 4. 11 (vol. XXI in twenty-
eight volumes， transl. by W. Mi1ler， p. 13， 1913). J. Higginbotham， Cicero on moral ob1igation， 
pp.42f.， 1967 
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similar attempts may be seen in the fol1owing. Here， 1 shal1 cite an idea given 
by Thomas Aquinas. 
Within the wider framework of Thomas' idea of lav.ヘ thatis， eternal 
law， natural law， human law， divine law， custom， attention Is to be paid to 
natural law. According to him， itis the first precept of the naturaI Iaw 
"that good is to be done and ensued，αnd evil is to be αvoided. AlI other 
precepts of the natural law are based upon this". Then， he proceeds to 
explain natural inc1ination， and accordingly three different precepts of 
natural Iaw commonly based on that first precept， the second of which 
is surely relevant to our topics: 
"Since， however， good has the nature of an endラ andevil， the nature of 
a contrary， hence it is that al those things to which man has a natural 
inc1ination， are naturally apprehended by reason as bcing good， and con-
sequently as objects of pursuit， and their contraries as evil， and objects of 
avoidance.Wheieおreaccording to the order of natural inc1inationsヲisthe 
order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of 
al an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in 
common with al1 substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preserva喝
tion of its own being， according to its nature: and by reason of this 
inc1ination， whatever is a means of preserving human life， and of warding 
off its obstac1es， belongs to the natural1aw. Secondly， there is in man an 
inc1ination to things that pertain to him more specially， according to that 
nature which he has in common with other animaIs: and in virtue of this 
inc1ination， those things are said to belong to the naturaI law， which nature 
has taught toαI animals， * such as sexuaI intercourse， education of off-
spring and so forth. Thirdly， there is in man an inc1ination to good， accord-
ing to the nature of his reason， which nature is proper to him: thus man 
has a natural inc1ination to know the truth about God， and to Iive in society: 
and in this respect， whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the 
natural law; for instance， toshun ignorance， toavoid offending those among 
whom one has to live， and other such things regarding the above inc1ina-
tion".12) His attention to Ulpian's natural law is evident in his Note， * 
12) Summa Theologica， Quest. 94， transL by S. Parry， Thomas Aquinas: Treatise 011 law， 
pp.60 f.， 1965. 
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Pandect. Just. 1.， tit. i. We shal1 again notice its interesting rearrangement in 
his frame of reference. 
Surely， we know other examples of this attempt besides Thomas'. Com-
mentators， for instance Azo in ltaly， Bracton13) in England， and others 
mentioned to the topic， instinctive naturallaw in connection with normαtive 
natural law. Ch. St幽Germa(i)n，14) Montesquieu，1S) S. Pufendorf，16) W. 
B1ackstone， etc.， also concerned with it. B1ackstone in a passage of “Com-
mentaries" said as follows: 
“LAW， in it's most general and comprehensive sense， signifies a rule 
of action; and is applied indiscriminately to al kinds of action， whethere 
animate or inanimate， rational or irrational. Thus we say， the laws of 
motion， of gravitation， of optics， or mechanics， aswell as the laws of nature 
and of nations. And it is that rule of action， which is prescribed by some 
superior， and which the inferior is bound to obey".1 7) 
13) Bracton， De !egibus et consuetudinibus Angliae， transl. by S. E. Thorne， 1 Bracton on th巴
laws and customs of England， pp.26 f.， 1968. 
14)“DOCTOURE) Fyrste it is to be vnderstande(that the lawe 01' nature maye be consyderyd 
in two maners(that is to saye([4bJ generally and specyally(when it is consyderyd generally(th巴nIt IS 
referryd to al creatures( as well resonable as vnresonable( for al vnresonabl巴 cr巴atureswhen un. 
impeded and not disorderedlyue vnder a certeyn巴 rewleto them gyuen by nature( necessarye for 
th巴m to the conseruacyon of theyr beyngef They preserve their kind; they nourish their young and 
theu' offspring by natural instinct， and by nature fear what is contrary to their being; and according 
to 101m Gerson the natural law of anima!s is that law which every animal has unless impeded or 
disordered， but of this law巴itis not our intent to treate at this tyme. Th巴i呈weof nature specyally 
consyderyd: which巴isalso called the lawe of [reason ] 2pertayneth' oonly to creatur巴sresonable that 
is man( whiche is create to the Ymage of god'¥ C. St. German's Doctor and Stud巴nt，First dialogue， 
Ch l， originally 1528， Selden Society's Publication， vo!. xci， ed. by T. F. T. Plucknett and J. L. 
Barton， p.13， 1974. 
15) See Montesquieu's passag巴quotedand criticized by Austin below. 
16)“The Roman Jurisconsults used to define the law of nature as ‘what nature taught al 
animals¥not， therefore， what it peculiar to man alone， but ‘what other animals as w巴nare supposed to 
knowいーーーー -Now although many actions of men and beasts are very much alike， by the perform-
ance of which a man is said to have satisfied the law， asa matt巴rof fact th巴reis a great difference 
between them， since among beasts they come from the simple inclination of their nature， while man 
p巴rformsthem from a sense， asit were， of obligation， asense whichbrutes do not have.ーー---Those， 
however， who like to giv巴 thedesignation of ‘a law of nature in lower animals' to the endowment 
of brutes whereby they perform specific actions， needlessly misuse the term ‘law¥But th巴reis no 
low巴ranimal which p巴rformsal the duties expected of man， and there is no duty of man the opposite 
of which many animals do not perform; a1though in general the popular feeling is greatly aroused 
against some crime， ifit be shown that even th巴 loweranimals avoid such deeds". S. Pufendorf， 
De jure naturae et gentium， 1688. The 1 
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This passage has a character seemingly close to instinctive natural law 
idea while having another character akin to the socal1ed imperative theory 
of law seen in T. Hobbes and J. Austin.“No passage in the Commentaries 
has been more severely criticised than this" wrote W. G.Hammond， the editor 
of the Commentaries in the latter ha1f of 19th century America. He again 
cited in the Note another writer's opinion to that passage.“The writer of 
the article on Sir William Blackstone in the ninth edition of the Encyclo-
paedia Britannica， vol. 3， pp. 800-802・聞-- evidently refers to it when he 
speaks of B. as“falling into the common error of identifying the various 
meanings of the word ‘law' ，" and says that “he has on1y the vaguest possible 
grasp of the elementary conceptions of 1aw. 百eevidently regards the 1aw 
of gravitation， the law of nature， and the law of Eng1and as different 
examples of the same principle， asru1es of action or conduct imposed by 
a superior power on its subject" ".18) Hammond himself， though negative 
in recognizing the imperative theory of law， appears positive to Blackstone's 
idea of law in a limited sense. 1n a limited sense? Yes， he shows us the 
principle of order.“If this be true， we must accept Blackstone's view of al 
law as essentially the same， so far as it represents the principle of order， of 
definite effects from definite causes， whether we find it in the realm of 
physics， of socia1 science， or of 1aw in the narrowest sense of the term in 
which it is used for the mles that govern the enforcement of human rights 
and duties".19) 
His idea of “principle of order" may imply three types of natura1 1aw 
(instinctive， latent， and normαtive)， in other words， various levels from is 
to ought， from fact to value in the same word. So， itis necessarily to be 
criti<:ized by scholars of dualistic trends for the confusion of both opposites. 
As it well known， the dualistic trends in theory and discussion inc1uding the 
field of law became in a considerable degree dominant in the modern West. 
But instinctive， or latent natural law idea stil1 remain somewhere in that 
same wor1d. 1 shall again refer to two responses to the Ulpian's naturallaw 
statement. One is C F. v. Savigny， another is J. Austin. 
18) W. G. Hammond's Blackstone， Commentaries， editor's note to Introduction， vol. 1， p. 95 f.，
1890. 
19) 18) p.101. 
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5 Savigny and Austin on Instinctive Natural Law 
Savigny in his articleラ“Jusnaturaleラ gentium，civile" spoke of the 
trichotomy (cf. p.14). According to him， Tryphonin and Hermogenian shared 
it with Ulpian. Instinctive natural law was summafIzed as fo11ows: "Es gab 
eine Zeit， worin die Menschen nur diejenigen Verh訂tnisseunter sich 
anerkanntenち welche ihnen mit den Thieren gemein sind: das der 
Geschlechter， und das der Fortpflanzung und Erziehung“20) Though he 
knew wel1 a series of condemnation to it， he tried to give it an interesting 
in terpretation. 
円Daserste， was an dieser‘Einthei1ung auff:託1t，und weshalb man sie oft 
getadelt ha仁 ist das den Thieren zugeschriebene Recht und Rechts-
bewusstseyn. A1lein wenn man nur den allerdings ubel gewahlten Ausdruck 
preisgiebt， so lasst sich die Ansicht selbstラvondieser Seite wohl vertheidigen. 
Jedes Rechtsverha1tniss hat zur Grundlage irgend einen Stoff，呂ufwelchen 
die Rechtsform angewendet wird， und der also auch abstrahirt von dieser 
Form gedacht werden kann. Diese Materie ist in den meisten Rechtsver幽
haltnissen insoferne von willkurlicher Art， dass ein dauerndes Bestehen des 
Menschengeschlechts auch ohne sie gedacht werden kann; so bey dem 
Eigenthum und den Obligationen. Nicht so bey den zwey oben genannten 
Verhaltnissen， die vielmehr allgemeine Naturverha1tnisse sind， den Menschen 
mit den Thieren gemein， und ohne welche das班enschengeschlechtgar kein 
dauerndes Dasein haben konnte. In der Tat also wird nicht das Rechtラ
sondern die 1VIaterie des Rechts， das demselben zum Grunde 1iegende Natur-
verhaltniss， den Thieren zugeschrieben. Diese Ansicht nun ist nicht nur 
wahr， sondern auch wichtig und der Beachtung werth; nur eignet sie sich 
nicht zu einer Einthei1ung des Rechts， namentlich fur das praktische 
Bedurfniss der Romer“21 ) 
What does "Nicht 50 bei den zwei oben genannten Vwerha1tnisse" 
mean? It means "das der Geschlechter， und das der Fortpflanzung und 
Erzi巴hung"，that is， the reJationship of male and female，品工ldthe relatiorト
20) C. F. v. Savigny， Jus natmal己， gentium， civile， Beylage zu Syst巴mdes h巴utigenromischen 
Rechts， Erster Band， 1840， S.415. 
21) 20) S. 416. 
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ship of male and fema1e， and of intercourse and education of their offsprings. 
Austin also referred to the same issue and in a very similar way to 
Savigny， but differed from Savigny in conc1usion. Let me cite Austin's 
passage. Ius naturale in Ulpian's sense， he pointed out，“is a name for the 
instincts of animals". He continues，“the instincts of animals are related to 
laws by the slender or remote analogy幽ー剛骨骨 It is true that the instincts 
of the animal man， 1ike many of his affections which are not instinctive， 
are amongst the causes of laws in the proper acceptation of the term. More 
especially， the laws regarding the relation of husband and wife， and the 
Iaws regarding the relation of parent and child， are mainly caused by the 
instincts which Ulpian particularly points at. And that， itis 1ikely， was the 
reason which determined this legal orac1e to c1ass the instincts of animals 
with laws imperative and proper. But nothing can be more absurd than 
the ranking with laws themselves the causes which lead to their existence. 
And if human instincts are laws because they are causes of laws， there is 
scarcely a facu1ty or affection belonging to the human mind， and scarcely 
a class of objects presented by the outward world， that must not be 
esteemed a law and an appropriate subject of jurisprudence".22) 
This attitude is also seen in his criticism of Montesuieu's famous passage. 
He cited and criticized it in the following way.“'Les lois， dans la significa司
tion la plus己tendue，sont les rapports necessaires qui derivent de la nature 
des choses: et dans ce sens tous les etres ont leurs lois: la Divinite a ses 
lois; le monde materiel a ses lois; les intel1igences superieures a l'homme ont 
leurs lois; les betes ont leurs lois; l'homme a ses lois.' Now objects widely 
different， though bearing a common name， are here blended and con-
founded.円23)
Savigny interprets that instinctive natural law in the 1ight of "Stoff“or 
円班aterieぺandAustin in the light of “cause". They are common in such 
a treatment of the matter. They also look like common in treating it as 
extra制legal. But， does not appear Savignγs attitude to the material rather 
positive than Austin's negative? So far， Savigny's perhaps may show us 
somewhat interesting hold in interpreting instinctive or latent natural law 
22) J. Austin， Lectures onjurisprudence， vol. 1， 5th ed.， ed. by R. Campbell， pp.209 f.， 1885 
23) 22) p.211. 
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toward a search for certain firmly established standard (for judgement). 
6 Modern Interpretation 
Now 1 shall turn to opinions on the topic expressed by a few scholars 
who worked or is working in 20th century. They are G. Radbruch， J.Frank， 
and H. L A. Hart. At first glance， they appears to have no intimate relation 
with each other. German， American， English scholars， however， having 
incidentally expressed their opinions about nature and so on， may be 
permitted to treat here in the same space. 
Radbruch's idea of “nature of things" is repeatedly stated in his books 
and articles. In the short paper， he treated instinctive natural law in con樽
nection with rerum natura， that is， nature of things. 円Diegrosen Urtat-
sachen und Urverhaltnisse， die. "Naturformen des Menschenlebens“ 
(VIKTO R HEHN) sind die tragenden Grundlagen des gesamten Rechts， 
besonders aber des Familien-und Erbrechts: Geburt und Tod， Kindheit， 
Jugend und Alter， Geschlechtsverbindung und Zeugung， Elternschaft und 
Kindschaft sind die animalen Tatsachen， auf die ULPIAN das Naturrecht 
in diesem Sinne gTUndet: quod natura omnia animalia docuit: maris atque 
feminae coniunctio， liberorum procreatio et educatio. Aber Stoffe des 
Rechts sind ale diese Verhaltnisse und Tatsachen nicht als rein naturale 
Rohstoffe， das Recht ruht nicht unmittelbar auf den naturlichen Ge-
schlechts-und Zeugungsverhaltnissen， vielmehr auf den Sozialgebilden， deren 
naturlichen Kern sie bilden". 24) 
Frank gives us a very interesting sketch of various interpretatios of 
nature and affirmatively referred to Mill's conception of nature as brutality 
(cited at the first part). Frank as a Realist attacks the traditionallegal myth 
especially in connection with the judical process. Idea of objective legal rules， 
mechanical legal reasoning， and so 011 are targets of his criticism based on 
facts-scepticism besides rule-scepticism. It does not mean， however， that he 
ignores any of value standards of intersubjective or objective validity， but he 
appears to have searched for them， surely in connection with the judicial 
process. “Some norトCatholicsbalk at calling the Catholic Natural Law 
24) G. Radbruch， Die Natur der Sache als juristische D巴nkform，Sonderausgabe， 1960， S.ll. 
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principles and precepts “eternal" or divine in origin. lndeed， tosuch persons 
- mindful of man's finiteness， his limited capacity for comprehending， 
intellectually or emotionally， al that goes on in the vast stretches of the 
universe beyond his ken - it seems presumptuous to assert that man 
should know what is eternal， or what constitutes order or regularity， present 
or future， except within his own small span of experience. But no decent 
non-Chatholic can fai1 to accept the few basic Natural Law principles or 
precepts as representing， atthe present time or for any reasonably fore-
seeable future， essential parts ofthe foundation of civilization".2S) 
Hart also referred to Mill's criticism on Montesquieu for confusion 
of descriptive statement of facts with prescriptive statement which is 
criticized by Austin as well as by Mill as cited above. Hart's idea， however， 
appears not to be exhausted by simple dualistic approach. Despite of his 
contention about the separation of “is" and “ought"， law and morals， he 
stil pay attention to a meaning of somewhat substantial factor underlying 
both， law and morals. For this purpose his treatment of a teleological 
conception of nature is worth noticing. 
At宣rst，he explains it as follows: “The doctrine of Natural Law is part 
of an older conception of nature in which the observable world is not 
merely a scene of such regularities， and knowledge of nature is not merely 
a knowledge of them. lnstead， on this older outlook every nameable kind 
of existing thing， human， animate， and inanimate， isconceived not only as 
tending to maintain itself in existence but as proceeding towards a definite 
optimum state which is the specific good - or the end (7Eλoc，finis) 
appropriate for it".26) Then， he proceeds to point out its similarity with 
and difference from modern secular thought. 
“The stages by which a thing of any given kind progresses to its specific 
or proper end are regular， and may be formulated in generalizations 
describing thething's characteristic mode of change， or action， or develop-
ment; to that extent the teleological view of nature overlaps with modern 
thought. The difference is that on the teleological view， the events regularly 
befalling things are not thought of mereかasoccurring regularly， and the 
questions whether they do occur regularly and whether they should occur 
25) 1) Frank， pp.364f. 
26) H. L. A. Hart， The concept oflaw， p.184， 1961. 
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or whether it is good that they occur are not regarded as separate ques-
tions".27) 
On the one hand， he clearly recognizes one of difficulties in understand-
ing teleological point of view in the minimization of differences between 
statements of what regularly happens and statements of what ought to 
happen，or human beings with a purpose of their own and other living or 
inanimate things. By maintaining and modifying such a point of view， on 
the other hand， he looks at natural fact as well as purpose of survival， 
especially human survival. According to him， teleological elements sti1l alive 
in ordinary thought about human action. “It will berightly observed that 
what makes sense of this mode of thought and expression is something 
entirely obvious: it is the tacit assumption that the proper end of human 
activity is survival， and this rests on the simple contingent fact most men 
most of the time wish to continue in existence".28) Though he continues to 
develop his idea to more refined “minimum content of natural lawぺits
holdフ1think， isto be found here in that treatment above. 
7 Conc1uding Remarks 
What do such attempts newly suggest us at present? I partly explained 
their meaning above. In addition， 1 shall pick up a few points below for 
sociocultural perspective on this issue. 
The dualistic approach in theory and discussion， symbolized by the 
separation of is and ought， fact and value， 1 think， isstil now useful and 
meaningful. Apart from the practical matters requiring each own value 
judgement， however， we even in that field do not only work on fact-qnalysis， 
its description， but sometimes work explicit1y or implicitly from normative 
point of view based on certain ultimate value. It is for this reason that 
problems of value standard are worth to attention in the field of law， stil 
more in the field of jurisprudence or phi1osophy of law. 
But it does not mean that problems be reduced to believe in and assert 
only one absolute value valid in the field of theory and discussion， too. If 
so， itleads to non-naturalistic or intuitive theory of ethical values. Hart's 
27) 26) p.185. 
28) 26) p.187. 
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attempt appears to show his commitment to this course of thinking by 
appealing to that end: survival. On the other hand， he treat it as end in a 
very c10se connection to contingent or natura1 fact of survival. So far his 
attempt a1so appears to imply contextua1 approach to reconsider va1ue or 
end under its context which in turn suggests us a modified idea of 
naturalistic theory of ethica1 values.29) 
Naturalistic tendencies are seen in Japan at present in various fields. 
One comes from certain reflection of and reaction to our environment 
increasingly destroyed， and the .other from attitude to reexamine the 
socalled re1ativism or noncognitivism in theoretica1 know1edge， and the third 
from an interesting discussion about interpretation or construction of the 
private law main1y re1ated to contracts， torts， etc.， in which naturalistic 
interpretation seemingly is made in terms of historica1 or sociological 
understandings of matters in contrast with interpretation based upon 
objective va1ue standards or re1ativistic attitude. 
As a matter of fact， the dualistic approach can not be ignored by such 
trends ofattempts. As to prob1ems of u1timate values to choose or prefer， 
however， both， naturalistic and non同naturalisticapproach are again to be 
kept in mind in addition to dua1ism， or noncognitivism. Three types of 
natura1 1aw， instinctive， 1atent， and normative， may be older fashioned 
conceptions. But they stil may offer some useful too1s for reconsideration 
of the issues above in this respect. 
29) Cf. also Hart， Positivism and the separation oflaw and morals， 71Harvard L. Rev.， pp.622f.， 
and， Problems of philosophy of law， in:EncycJopedia of Philosophy， ed. by P. Edwards， p.273， 1967. 
